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BOOK REVIEWS
THE

SToRY oF LAw.

By John M. Zane. New York: Washburn,

1927. Pp. xiii, 486.
The object of this book, according to its author is "to put
the story of legal development in such a way that it may carry
interest to the general reader." With this object kept strictly
in mind it may be said that the book is successful, as undeniably
it is informative, it is interesting, and it is full of evidences of
that great fund of general information that is the principal charm
of Mr. Zane's writing. It does tell the story of legal development
in a manner suited to the needs of the intelligent layman.
Proceeding now to a general description of the book and
the thesis around which it is built, the body of the law, he holds,
is a development, but an almost entirely unconscious and largely
uncontrolled development, of the human race. In its first dawn
rules were few because the pastoral society of that day had few
problems to vex it. With the rise of agriculture and, even more,
of commerce human relations become more involved, and necessarily there came more complex rules to govern these relations.
At this stage came the first great law system of which we have
definite knowledge and which is the first link in the chain running
down to today-the famous Babylonian Code of Hammurabi. This
system, with detailed rules often strikingly like our own of today,
was the parent of the Jewish law, which became its successor after
the Assyrian conquest ended the great days of Babylon. To this
state, says Mr. Zane, we owe "the emergence of the individual,"
that is, a recognition of individual, rather than family, responsibility, a step forward the importance of which was even greater
than is its obviousness today. From the Jews the torch passed
somehow-we are not told very clearly how-to the Greeks, who
by their logical genius and keen analysis greatly developed substantive law but who failed entirely in the task of simultaneously
advancing adjective law. Litigation With them never rose above
a submittal of a case to the tender mercies of the Athenian mob,
however imposing the name by which that mob might momentarily
clothe itself. But the beauty and symmetry of the Greek, or
rather Athenian, system were not wasted. They profoundly impressed that even more logical and far more practical people,
the Romans, who proceeded to remake and recreate the old into
an essentially new system, which has ever since been and for long
will be the wonder and admiration of all law students. Then camethe crash, seemingly permanent, of human knowledge, and only
ages later the slow reawakening, thanks to the small spark of
learning which had been preserved by the church to regulate its
internal and exterior affairs. The canon law was the source
from which civil law was recreated thoughout Europe, in England no less than on the continent, due partly to its manifest
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superiority to the uncouth Anglo-Saxon law, and partly because,
after the Norman Conquest, all the great judicial officers were
uniformly church trained men.
The thread having now been followed to England, the remainder of the book, forming nearly one-half of it, traces the
principal changes in the English law, such as the creation of the
jury system and the rise of two entirely separate systems-common law and equity-and finally fits our own American law into
the picture by describing its outgrowth from' English law.
This then is the picture as Mr. Zane paints it. It remains to
ask how well and convincingly he has done his work. And here
almost from the very first page we are brought squarely face to
face with the two shortcomings that so- often, and so needlessly,
mar much of Mr. Zane's writing. One of these is a propensity
to make sweeping remarks that obviously will not bear close
scrutiny. The other is the unfair comment, one might almost
say abuse, with which he finds it necessary to heap all those with
whom he disagrees. Nothing will more quickly and more surely
alienate the sympathy of every fair reader. His opponents almost invariably have "childish minds;" they "think they prove
something." Of a statement made by John Chipman Gray he says,
"Could anything be more absurd? He was demonstrating merely
that he did not know what law was." Heinrich K6hler and Rudolph
Stammler, two of Germany's, and Europe's, recent great lights,
are contemptuously described as "men considered jurists." Plato's
only great characteristic, it seems, was his "rock-ribbed conceit."
His venturing to believe that he could contribute anything to
legal learning was "pathetic." In fact his book on the "Laws"
has in it "nothing of value" "although many simple souls .
have been impressed." And as for those modern reformers who
believe that our criminal law is not yet in a state of absolute
perfection in its treatment of insanity as a defense, they themselves are probably the ones who are insane. At any rate "the
common sense of mankind should consistently refuse to listen to
the confused stammerings of these maudlin phrenologists." But
illustrations need not be multiplied. Enough has been said to
make clear the unholy joy felt by the reader when Mr. Zane in
some sweeping remark in turn lays himself open to attack. Nor
are such occasions so rare. Sometimes they are so obvious as
to raise merely a puzzled feeling how they are possible. For
example he says that in primitive times "the making of a will
was, of course, unknown, for it could not be conceived of until
language came to be written." But what of the nuncupative will?
What of the earliest Roman wills? Or of post obit gifts in early
Anglo-Norman days? All these were transactions in which no
writing was involved. Or again: He dismisses what he calls
the metaphysical or philosophical justifications of private property
,by saying: "The real justification is a more prosaic matter.
PrPivate property in real and personal property exists because
if not so owned, the property cannot be bought and.sold and dis-
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osed of in the ordinary course of trade." In other words, there
has to be private property because if there were not, there would
be nothing to buy or sell! One is sorely tempted to make use,
hereabouts, of Mr. Zane's own adjective, "childish." Or again:
With reference to the value of an oath as making testimony
'nore likely to be truthful, on p. 96 he says, "there are countless
'people who do not hesitate to prevaricate, but if they are put
under oath the old commandment has its effect," whereas on
p. 235 belief in the value of an oath gets the usual label of "childish."
Some of his non-sequiturs are no less curious. For example
this explanation of how the lex talionis, an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth, arose (p. 35): The primitive tribe had an
instinct of self-preservation. When one of its members hurt another this instinct of self-preservation was hurt. The old equality
was yearned for. Therefore the injured person was permitted
to recreate such an equality between him and his assailant by
mutilating him in the same manner in which he had been mutilated. Rather neat, to demonstrate that the instinct of selfpreservation demanded that there be two injuries instead of one!
Even more curious is this specimen (pp. 43-44): An infant at primitive law only became a member of the family if
the father formally acknowledged it; he might, if he chose, deny
that it was his. (True enough.) Therefore it was it his disposal
to kill or let live, hence the custom of infanticide. To say that
'a denial of ownership confers a right to destroy the object not
owned is surprising, to put it mildly. And on the next page
'he adds that such destruction of unwanted babes was the origin
'of human sacrifice. But we all know that primitive sacrifice was
the giving up of very much wanted things to a spirit which pre-sumably also wanted them-never of unwanted objects.
Such errors, even though they are annoying, are largely innocuous because they are apparent. Others, being of a more
technical nature, are more dangerous, as they will be noticed
'only by the lawyer-reader, whereas the book is meant at least
-equally for the layman. Of such a nature is the extended description of how a new law system came to arise at Rome. This, Mr.
Zane says, was due to a feeling that it was unfair to subject the
stranger within the gates to the technicalities of the system applied
between citizens. A strange and surprising solicitude for the usually
despised and harshly treated outsider! Anyone who has read
Fustel de Coulange's great book, "La Cit6 Antique," will notice
'how falacious this is. The ancient mind conceived of law as an
'exclusively local possession, handed down by one's local gods,
and a sacred heritage not to be shared with outsiders. From that
idea came the need of a separate new system for the more.and
more numerous foreigners at Rome. That it turned out to be a
better system was merely an unintended and unexpected result.
A final example of the author's not entire reliability bears
on his effort to show to what a great extent even the English
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-law is merely a development of Roman law, a thesis which he
,carries much further than most writers do. To help bring this
-out he describes a certain royal ediot of Charles the Bald, and the
proceedings consequent on it, both of which, he triumphantly
-points out, were pure Roman law. No doubt, but what of it?
'It has no bearing on English law, as Charles the Bald was not
a king of Englanfd but of France.
This review will no doubt be regarded as an unfavorable
-one. Yet it would be unfortunate to leave this impression too
-definitely. If the book is not a great one and if faults can readily
be found in it, it nevertheless does picture clearly the great
surge of the law, ever forward. It does so in a manner that
is never boring and almost always interesting. And it is richly
adorned with evidences of that ripe and wide-spread knowledge,
with which Mr. Zane is so richly endowed. And these, be it said,
are no mean merits.
E. W.

PUTTKAMMER.

A STUDY IN THE FEDFrankfurter and James
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927.

THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
ERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM. By Felix

M. Landis.
Pp. viii, 349.
"The little community of Euclid Village enacts a zoning ordinance; the Supreme Court has to pass on it. The United States
makes a treaty with Germany concluding the Great War; not until
the Supreme Court has spoken, in a law-suit nominally between
two individuals, do we know the limits and meaning of the treaty.
The Senate seeks to investigate the propriety of contributions in
senatorial campaigns; the power to pursue such investigation turns
on Supreme Court decisions.

.

.

.

Most of the problems

of modern society, whether of industry, agriculture or finance,
of racial interactions or the eternal conflict between liberty and
authority, are sooner or later legal problems for solution by our
courts, and, ultimately, by the Supreme Court of the United States"
(pp. v-vi). In such graphic manner do the authors of this book
introduce its theme, and thus lucidly portray the tremendous scope
of the business of the federal courts. Indeed, the materials presented in the book are themselves so tremendous in scope that one
is at first inclined to wonder at the principal title and to feel
that the sub-title is much more apt. As one penetrates with
the authors into the maze of procedure, practice, and business
in the Supreme Court. one readily appreciates how closely knit
is the whole system. aft.-r all; how "the efficacy of the Supreme
Court was seen to depend upon the distribution of federal judicial
power and the system of courts devised for its exercise" (p. 70).
In other words, in order to examine into the business of the Supreme Court, Professors Frankfurter and Landis have been impelled to study the working of the entire federal judicial system.
They-have, for example, given us in considerable detail the legislative history of almost every act of Congress relating to the fed-

